How Russians’ Attitudes Toward Those Who Left Are Changing: Traitors or Victims?

Photo: hsmedia.ru

The emigration of recent years has divided Russian society, and this is reflected in the data collected by Margarita Zavadskaya in a study for Riddle. Different assessments form a contradictory image of the emigrant, simultaneously provoking condemnation, sympathy, and irritation. Surveys show different dynamics in the change of attitudes — according to some data, negative manifestations are decreasing, while others suggest the situation is worsening.

Figures and Dynamics

In April 2025, the Levada Center recorded that negative assessments still prevail. A third of Russians consider emigrants “traitors and betrayers of the Motherland”, another 36% see them as people who have lost faith in the country’s future. A smaller portion associates leaving with forced circumstances: 29% cite mobilization as the main motive, 17% fear of political repression, 10% the threat of discrimination. No more than 10% openly express sympathy, comparable to the small share of those who would like to emigrate themselves (about 9% in 2023–2024).

At the same time, there is a gradual softening of perceptions: if in 2022 distrust of those who left was expressed by 41% of respondents, by summer 2025 this share had dropped to 33%. The proportion of those who describe emigrants as “educated and talented” rose from 13% in March 2024 to 17% in April 2025.

Older men are more likely than others to insist that those who left are traitors. Young people and women are more lenient: they tend to explain emigration by forced circumstances and more often express understanding. Education level has little effect on the answers, which suggests that attitudes are shaped not by knowledge but under the influence of mass narratives and emotional stereotypes.

The picture is complemented by the results of a panel online survey conducted by the University of Helsinki in 2024–2025 under Zavadskaya’s supervision. These data record growing distrust: if in spring 2024 it was expressed by 26% of respondents, by summer 2025 it had risen to 33%. Among young people aged 18–29, only 17% felt this way, while among those over 50 it was more than half. Men are stricter toward emigrants (41%) than women (36%). Between a quarter and a third of respondents found it difficult to answer, indicating both the sensitivity of the issue and indifference to it.

Government Policy and Public Resentment

The state discourse consistently entrenches negative attitudes toward emigrants. In public rhetoric, the expression “civil death” has spread, denoting the loss of the right to participate in the country’s life for those who left. This formula is reinforced by concrete steps: tightening tax rules for those working abroad, bans on holding positions in the public sector, and expanding the practice of designating “foreign agents.” Emigration is presented as a final break, after which a return to the previous status is impossible.

The cultural field plays an equally important role, where emigrants gradually turn into “non-returnees.” After the war began, artists who left or openly criticized the authorities disappeared from TV and radio. A striking example was Alla Pugacheva, who faced fierce attacks: she was reproached for “trampling herself as a person” and “turning her back on the country”. The same category of “others” included Zemfira, Boris Grebenshchikov, Andrei Makarevich, Monetochka, Noize MC—all of whom were declared “foreign agents.” By the end of 2023, an unspoken “stop list” operated on radio: emigrants’ songs stopped being broadcast.

In contemporary cultural content, relocants are either absent altogether or portrayed as caricatures. Stories are often presented in a humorous vein: jokes, memes, and sketches mock those who allegedly failed to adapt abroad. Telegram channels circulate stories of “loser IT workers” who returned to Russia. Artists loyal to the authorities reinforce this narrative: singer Lada Dance said she did not understand how one could “turn their back on their country and hate their people”.

Yet distrust is formed not only from above but also from below—through personal grievances and a sense of injustice. The mass exodus of 2022 was a shock: for many it meant the loss of friends, colleagues, and neighbors, and for others—disappointment because they themselves wanted to leave but could not. This breeds irritation and the question: “Why could they leave, while we have to endure hardships?” Such emotions fuel resentment even within the opposition. The authorities skillfully exploit these feelings, channeling them into loyalty and reinforcing the narrative that “you don’t choose your homeland or your time”.

Spontaneous memes have had a strong influence. The most enduring image has been that of the “white coat.” In internet slang, it denotes demonstratively righteous and morally superior behavior, and in the context of emigration it is used against those who criticize what is happening from abroad. The phrase “take off the white coat” means abandoning a moralizing position. For those who left, this meme has become a tool of discrediting: their voice is perceived as arrogant moralizing even before their arguments are heard. At the same time, the harshest accusations against those who stayed do not come from post-war emigration, but from privileged groups. Nevertheless, it is those who left after 2022 who are labeled with the “white coat,” reinforcing alienation and entrenching the divide.

Restrictions Instead of Dialogue

Despite the pressure, many emigrants continue to maintain ties with Russia. They are disappointed in the state, but not in society: they help relatives and friends, transfer money to independent initiatives, and spread information. Bridges are not completely destroyed, but the state discourse does everything to instill the opposite—as if emigration means a total break and the loss of the right to a voice.

Kommersant reminds that at the end of August 2025, State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin proposed banning former relocants from taking jobs in government structures and state corporations, stating that “they abandoned the country and their loved ones” and then try to return, “walking through offices” in search of positions. He was supported by Vasily Piskarev, head of the State Duma Security Committee, who noted that the fact of living abroad would be taken into account during checks. Sergey Mironov, leader of “A Just Russia – For Truth,” spoke in favor of a partial ban: those who “slandered the Motherland” should not be admitted, but “clean” ones could. The LDPR proposed even harsher measures, while the Communist Party warned of risks of unconstitutionality. Lawyers emphasize: to implement such initiatives, formal criteria will have to be written—for example, the presence of a residence permit abroad or accounts in foreign banks, which are already used as grounds for denying public service.

In previous years, the authorities developed programs to bring back those who had left, primarily IT specialists. Today the vector has changed: large-scale inspections of foreign accounts and residence permits have begun, and raising taxes for emigrants is under discussion. The State Duma has already approved a bill on the seizure of relocants’ property if they commit offenses against Russia’s interests abroad. Thus, rhetoric and practice are becoming increasingly harsh.